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CASE NOTE
TURTLE POWER: THE NINTH CIRCUIT AVOIDS A TRAGEDY ON THE HIGH SEAS
Turtle Island Restoration \eniork v. Nalional .11arine Fisheries Service'
1. \ITRODLCTIO\
liIt is in the best interest of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variation. The reason is
simple. They are ke\ s to puIzzes \e cannot solve. and may provide answers to questions which
we have not l Ct learned to ask.
Sea turtles w\ere once abundant off the shores of the United States.3 Toda1 all six species of sea turtle
are listed as either endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act. Longline fishing has been
linked to the incidental catch and capture. or -take.* of sea turtles. adding to the decline of the species.' The
decline in sea turtles has caused international recognition of the need for preservation and conservation of the
species.
The Ninth Circuit has taken a significant step forward in protecting the remaining fragile populations of
sea turtles. The instant case requires the National Marine Fisheries Service to engage in the consultation
process required by the lEndangered Species Act to determine if issuing longline fishing permits will likely
jeopardize the suL ival of sea turtles.
11. FACTS A\ND HOLDI\G
The Center for Biolouical Diversity and the Turtle Island Restoration Network, ("Center") brought suit
awainst the National Marine Fisheries Sen ice (-Fisheries Service") alleging that the Fisheries Service was in
violation of Sections 7 and 9 of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). This case arose out of practices of
United States flagship vessels that eneace in lonuline fishinu in international waters and "land their catch" in
340 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2003).
133 Comi. Ri . HI 1248 (dail\ ed. Dec. 1!. 1987) (statement of Rep. Thomas).
Press Release. Conservation International. Iacific Leatherback Turtle Could Go Extinct in 10 Years (Feb. 26, 2004) (available at
http: %kwiv.conseration.org xp new\s press releases 2004 022604.xml).
50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2004).
The Humane Societ\ of the U.S.. Loig/inc Fishin Threatens Sea Birds and Other Marine Life Species. at
http: %% ww-.hsus.org ace 15050 (last isited Oct. 18. 2004).
('See discussion infr-a Part II .A.2.
Turtle Island Restoration Networkv. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.. 340 F.3d 969. 972 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id at 972. Section 7 of the ESA states in part that jejach Federal agency shall. in consultation with and with the assistance of the
Secretary. insure that any action authorized. funded. or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species
which is determined by the Secretary. atter consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical, [unless an exemption
applies.]** 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). Regulations promulgated regarding the implementation of the ESA state that Section 7 of
the ESA only applies to discretionarn federal actions or control. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2004). Section 9 of the ESA imposes liability for
the "taking" of protected species. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
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California.! Until recently, the industry operated primarily in Hawaii.'" The industry moved to California after
an injunction in Hawaii banned the practice. The injunction followed a biological opinion. which found the
industr7's continued operation in Hawaii would jeopardize the survival of several protected species of sea
turtle.
Pursuant to the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act ("Compliance Act-). the Fisheries Service permitted
the vessels to engage in longline fishing activities.12 The Fisheries Service issued the permits without initiating
the Section 7 consultation process of the ESA.' 3 The Fisheries Service believed that under the Compliance Act.
they did not retain sufficient discretion in issuing permits to trigger the consultation process of Section 7.14
The Center contended that issuing permits violated Section 7 of the ESA. because the Fisheries Service
failed to engage in the consultation process to investigate the effects of longline fishing on protected marine
species.' 5  In this case, the sea turtles were both endangered and threatened species.' 6 Further. the Center
charged the Fisheries Service with being in violation of section 9 of the ESA by allowing the fishing vessels to
engage in activity that results in the "taking- of the protected species. " In particular. the Center alleged that the
Fisheries Service was liable when. under its authority. a private party took a protected species."' In July of
2000, the Center notified the Secretary of Commerce of its intent to sue \ia letter.
The Fisheries Service responded that under its interpretation of the Compliance Act. the Agency did not
have discretion to impose restrictions on permits.' 9 In the absence of agency discretion Section 7 of the ESA
was not applicable.20  Moreover, the Fisheries Service stated that they were in the process of preparing a
management plan for migratory species of the high seas. during which. an ESA consultation would be
prepared. 21 In response to the final allegation of "takings." the Fisheries Service indicated that it would
investigate the taking of any protected species by those engaged in the high seas fishing industry.
Subsequently, the Center brought suit against the Fisheries Service through the citizen suit provision of the
ESA.23
The case was resolved in the district court on cross motions for summary nudment. The district court
found for the Fisheries Service. 2 Although the district court noted that the Fisheries Service had some
discretion in issuing high sea permits. it found this discretion to be insufficient for the Agencv to condition the
Turtle Island Restoration Network. 340 F. 3d at 971. Lonuline fishine invokcs stretchine a line tler se'eral miles anchored at
specific depths with baited hooks numbering in the thousands on the length ot the line. Lonuline thhers are interested mainl in






's Id. at 971. The High Seas Compliance Act states in pertinent part that L.S. \essels are obligated to acquire a permit that authorizes
the vessels to fish on the high seas. 16 U.S.C. (§ 5504-5506 (2000. In addition, the Compliance Act places certain conditions and
proscriptions on the issuance of permits. Id. § 5503.
16 16 U.S.C. § 1533. The affected species include the leatherback. loeuerhead. olit e ridle\ and green sea turtles as well as the short-
tailed albatross. 50 C.F.R. §17.11 (2004). See also Turtle Island Restoration Network. 340 [.3d at 971-72 n.4-8. All are either
threatened or endangered. Turtle Island Restoration Neiwork. 340 F.3d at 971-72.





' Id. at 970.
24 Id. at 972.
25 Id.
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permits to inure to the benefit of the sea turtles.26 Based on this reasoning, the district court held the Fisheries
27Service was not in violation of Section 7 of the ESA. According to the court, because the Fisheries Service
did not have discretion, they could not be liable for the taking of protected species by private fishing vessels
under Section 9 of the ESA.
The Center appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 29 The question on appeal was
whether issuing longline fishing permits invoked the Section 7 consultation process of the ESA.30 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient agency discretion, as indicated by the plain language of
the Compliance Act, to trigger the consultation process of the ESA.3 1 The Fisheries Service was required to
comply with the consultation process of the ESA, because the Agency retained sufficient discretion in issuing
permits under the Compliance Act. 32 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. concluding that the Fisheries
Service was required to conduct the consultation process under Section 7 of the ESA.33 Finally. the case was
remanded for the district court to determine the claims brought under Section 9 of the ESA.34
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. International Conservation Measures for Marine Resources
The United States is party to a number of agreements that provide for the protection and use of high seas
marine resources. Many of the agreements are designed to protect marine species that are threatened or
endangered, and most require restrictions on high seas fishing. For example, the Inter-American Convention for
the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles ("Convention") seeks to protect, and trigger the recovery of. sea
turtles.35  The Convention seeks to achieve this goal through requiring the signatory countries to take the
necessary measures to stop the capturing and killing of sea turtles.36
In an attempt to avoid such restrictions, existing fishing vessels began to re-flag their ships in countries
who were not parties to these agreements.3 7 Additionally, new fishing vessels chose to flag in countries that did
not place restrictions on fishing vessels.3 8  In response to these concerns, the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization negotiated the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas ("Agreement). 3 9
Id. at 975.
27 Id. at 972.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 970.
30Id.
' Id. at 975.
32 Id. at 977.
33Id.
34Id.
3 Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles. Dec. 1. 1996. art. II. S. IRi.1TY Dx. No. 105-48
(1998), available at http://www.seaturtle.orgIiac/convention.shtmi [hereinafter Convention].
36 Susan L. Sakmar, Free Trade and Sea Turtles: The International and Domestic Implications of/the Shrimp- Turdes Case. I 0 COL. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 345, 362 (1999). See also Convention. supra note 35. art. IV.
" Turtle Restoration Network, 340 F. 3d at 973.
' Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law. 90 AM. J. INT' L. L. 267. 268 (1996).
3 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High
Seas, Nov. 24, 1993 S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-24. available at htp: //www.fao.org/DOCREP/MEETING!003'X3130m X3130EOO
.HTM # Contents [hereinafter Agreement].
59
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I.Agreeineni i Promole Compliance w ith International Conservalion and Management Measures by Fishing
I essels on the High Seas
The Agreement requires the signatory countries to impose restrictions on fishing vessels, 40 to protect
certain marine species.4' The Agreement seeks to promote compliance with international conservation
measures and ensure transparency in high seas fishing.42  The Agreement imposes responsibilities on the
signatory countries.4 3 These responsibilities include prohibiting fishing vessels registered in signatory countries
from fishing on the high seas without proper authorization.4 4 The Agreement requires each party take
precautions to ensure that vessels flagged by its country do not engage in activities which may "undermine the
effectiveness of the international conservation and management measures" of the Agreement.
2. Inter-Arinerican Conventionfor the Protection and Conservation ofSea Turtles
In 1990. Congress called for a multi-national initiative to address the plight of sea turtles.46 This
initiated a lenothv negotiation with Latin American nations to address international conservation and protection
of sea turtles. Ultimately in 1996. the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea
Turtles (Convention") was drafted and signed. The Convention is the only international agreement devoted to
sea turtles.4 8
The objective of the Convention is to protect, conserve, and recover sea turtles and their habitats.49 To
achieve this objective. the Convention requires that signatory parties reduce incidental capture, injury, and death
caused by commercial fisheries.50 The Convention states that the reduction should be through "appropriate
regulation of such activities [commercial fishing]."5 The Convention calls for measures that will, to the extent
practicable. limit human activity which interferes with the survival of the sea turtles, particularly durin
reproduction. 2 On May 22. 1998, President Clinton sent the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent.
The treaty was subsequently ratified. and President Clinton signed it on October 12, 2000.54
Id. at art. Ill.
41 See id. at Preamble.
L Nash. supra note 38. at 268.
4 See Agreement. supra note 39. at art. III.
Id. -No tp]arty shall allow any fishing vessel entitled to fly its flag to be used for fishing on the high seas unless it has been
authorized to be so used by the appropriate authority or authorities of that [plarty. A fishing vessel so authorizes shall fish in
accordance with the conditions on the authorization." Id.
4 Id.
41 Marian Nash. Contemporary Practice of the Unites States Relating to International Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L 734, 742 (1998).
7 Id.
48 Convention. supra note 35. at Introductory Remarks, available at http://www.seaturtle.org/iac/intro.shtml (last updated May 6,
2003).
9 Convention. supra note 35. art. II.
SO Nash. supra note 46 at 742.
51 Convention. supra note 35. art. IV.
52 Id.
5 Karla J. Black & Greg Domareki. Recent Development. A Review of Developments in Ocean and Costal Law 2000, 6 Ocean &
Coastal L.J. 233. 251 (2001).
4 Id.
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B. Species (onservation .tleures In the United States
I. The High Seas Fishing Compliance 4ci
In the spring of 1994. President Clinton sent the Agreement to the Senate for advice and consent.ss The
following year. President Clinton signed the Fisheries Act of 1995. which included the High Seas Fishing
Compliance Act ("Compliance Act").: ' 1y enacting the Compliance Act. the United States became a party to,
and implemented. the Agreement. The Compliance Act had two purposes: (1) to implement the Agreement
and: (2) to establish a system for relifating and issuing permits to high seas fishing vessels.57
The permit system defines eligibility. describes the application process and states that the Secretary of
Commerce may impose conditions on the permits "as are necessary and appropriate to carry out the obligations
of the United States under the Ag ureement . . In addition to creating a permit system for high seas vessels,
the Compliance Act prohibits certain activities and creates an enforcement mechanism for violations.59 Further,
the Secretar\ of Commerce is empowered to promulgate regulations for implementing the Compliance Act.60
2he Ei'Lndcngered Species Aci
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (-ESA-) has been called the -broadest and most powerful-law"
with the purpose of protecting species whose continued existence is threatened.6 ' Concern over the extinction
of various species as a result of economic development sparked the enactment of the ESA of 1973.62 Passage of
the ESA represented a culmination of a number of previous conservation and preservation acts aimed at wildlife
manacement.
The FSA pro\ ides -a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species
. and sets forth the policy that the federal go\ ernment ",shall seek to conserve" those species.' 4 The Act's goals
are achieved though a number ot procedures. which are overseen by the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce.65
The Secretary of Interior must keep a list of endangered species. designate critical habitats for those species,
assess the effects of auenc\ action on those species. prepare restoration plans for the species, and enforce the
la\ against harming protected species.1 The Secretaries have authorized the Fisheries Service to oversee the
conservation and protection efforts with for marine species. and the Fish and Wildlife Service for terrestrial
species .
As mentioned above. the ESA requires that the Secretary of Interior assess the effects of agency action
on protected species. This is achieted through the consultation process in Section 7 of the ESA. In essence,
Nash. upttlr. iiot;' 38. at 20-
it




1 S'i \\I-( lil) I \vll ( i\Mt \1 1. !1 1 i I [Hi F\DAN\i RI.D SPii :s AcT. 10 (Stanford University Press 2001) [hereinafter
Si 1..C\()l.
lit Iat 14.
5;0 '.F.R. § 402.01 t2004i.
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section 7(a)(2) is a procedural requirement that all federal agencies consult with either the Fisheries Service or
the Fish and Wildlife Service prior to discretionary agency action .6" The purpose of the consultation process is
to ensure federal actions do not jeopardize the survival of protected species or result in harm to the species'
habitat. 70 According to the Supreme Court. this section indicates that Congress intended "agencies to afford the
first priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered species."7 1 In Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill, the Court upheld an injunction of a nearly complete dam in the Tennessee Valley for the benefit and
protection of the snail darter, an endangered species of perch. because there was an "irreconcilable conflict
between operation [of the dam] and the explicit provisions of § 7 of the Endangered Species Act.....
The Ninth Circuit test to determine if an agency action requires consultation is whether the agency has
the ability to implement measures that "inure to the benefit of protected species."' Other courts have
determined that there must be sufficient agency discretion to benefit protected species for the requirements of
section 7(a)(2) to apply.74  Absent the ability to impose conditions or restrictions on the agency action the
consultation process would be useless.
If the consultation process is triggered because an agency action is "likely to affect" a protected species.
the Agency must complete a biological assessment of the proposed action.76 The biological assessment will
determine if the action may jeopardize the survival or critical habitat of the species. 7 If the Agency determines
that, in fact, the action puts at risk the protected species the fornmal process of consultation must begin.
otherwise the Agency can proceed with informal consultation with either the Fisheries Service or the Fish and
Wildlife Service depending on the species involved.78 If. after formal consultation with the appropriate --expert
agency", it is determined that no harm will come to the protected species. the proposed agency action is allowed
to proceed as planned. 79 Alternatively. if it is determined that the proposed action will jeopardize the protected
species, the "expert agency" will identify reasonable alternatives that would avoid violating the ESA.' If there
are no reasonable alternatives, the action will be prohibited."'
Generally, once it is determined that an agency action may affect a protected species. the action should
not be undertaken until the consultation process is initiated. 2 In order to avoid irreversible and irretrievable
commitment, the bar on action continues until the consultation process is completed."
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). See also 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 ('-Section 7 and the requirements of this part\ apply to all actions in which
there is discretionary Federal involvement or control." 1.
70 STANFORD, supra note 61. at 83.Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153. 185 (1978).
72 Id. at 192-193.
7 Sierra Club v. Babbitt. 65 F.3d 1502. 1509 (9th Cir. 1995): Ste' also Nat'I Res. Del Council %. Houston. 146 F.3d 1118. I 125-26
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that 'where there is no agenc\ discretion to act. the FSA does not appl,").
Strahan v. Linnon, 967 F.Supp. 581, 607-08 (D. Mass. 1997).
7 Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat'I Marine Fisheries Ser%.. 340 F.3d 969. 974 (9th cir. 2003) (citing Babbin. 65 F.3d at
1509).
76 STANFORD, supra note 61. at 84.
n 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(a) (2004).78 Id
STANFORD, supra note 61. at 84. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2000).
s STANFORD. supra note 61, at 84.
See general/v Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill. 437 U.S. 153. 193-94 (1978).
Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441. 1455 n.34 (1988).
8' 50 C.F.R. § 402.09 (2004).
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D. Judicial Review
Judicial review of administrative decisions under the ESA is governed by Section 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act.84 Under this section, an agency determination may only be set aside if the action
is "arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."85 The court of appeals
reviews summary judgments de novo.86 The appellate court reviews cases concerning administrative decisions
from the point of view of the district court.87
In Chevron, the Supreme Court promulgated a two step test to determine if an Agency's construction of
a statue is entitled to deference by the court.88 First, the reviewing court must determine if Congress has zlearly
and explicitly spoken to the issue at hand, and if so, Congress's intent must be given effect.89 If the agency's
interpretation of the statute is contrary to the unambiguous intent of Congress the court must reject the
interpretation. 90 The Supreme Court directs reviewing courts to use traditional tools of statutory construction to
determine if Congress had intent on the particular issue at bar. 91 However, if the intent of Congress is unclear.
the court must determine if the agency's interpretation is reasonable. 92 If the interpretation is a permissible
construction of the statue the interpretation is granted deference. 93
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The question on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether issuing fishing permits. as
required by the Compliance Act, requires the consultation process of the ESA. 94 The court began its analysis by
answering the question of whether issuing fishing permits was an agency action that would implicate the ESA.9 5
The court cited the Code of Federal Regulations, which lists examples of agency action. including granting
permits. 9  Agency action is interpreted broadly, and essentially encompasses any agency action funded in full
or in part by the Untied States.97 Relying on the broad interpretation agency action has been given. the court
found issuing fishing permits was an agency action that could trigger the ESA.98
After it decided the threshold question of agency action. the court had to determine if there was
sufficient discretion vested in Fisheries Service to trigger Section 7 of the ESA.9 The test used by the court
was whether the Agency had the ability to "inure to the benefit of [the] protected species."'o The district court
found that although Fisheries Service retained some discretion in the issuance of fishing permits. they did not
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
85Id.
86 Sierra Club v. Babbitt. 65 F.3d 1502. 1507 (9th Cir. 1995).87 Nev. Land Action Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv.. 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993).
88 Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat'I Res. Def. Council. Inc.. 467 U.S. 837. 842-43 (1984).
89 Id.
90 Id at 843 n.9.
91 Id
92 Id. at 843.
9" Id.
9 Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.. 340 F.3d 969. 970 (9th Cir. 2003).
" Id. at 974.
9 Id. See also 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2004).
9 Turtle Island Restoration Network. 340 F.3d at 974.
9 Id.
9 Id. (citing Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co.. 255 F.3d 1073. 1083 (9th Cir.2001 ) (internal quotations omitted)).
10 Id.
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retain sufficient discretion to impose restrictions that would inure to the benefit of the sea turtles.' 0 The court
of appeals disagreed. 12
The Ninth Circuit relied on a combination of traditional statutory construction doctrines to come to this
conclusion.' 0 3 The court noted that -every clause and word of the statue" should be given effect and that the
text should be viewed in light of the whole structure and scheme of the statute.104 The Compliance Act states
that the Fisheries Service may condition the issuance of fishing permits, and lists two types of conditions that
may be used.1os Noting that traditionally the language "including but not limited to" indicated a non-exclusive
list. the court found that the language clearly indicated Congress' intent to instill in Fisheries Service the ability
to condition fishing permits for reasons other than those listed. 06 Here, Congress's intent was clear, and in
order to give effect to that intent, the court found the Fisheries Service's interpretation was not entitled to
Chevron deference. 1o
The appellate court distinguished the two Ninth Circuit cases relied on by both the district court and the
Fisheries Service. 1o The court stated that although each of these cases dealt with agency discretion that
triggered Section 7 consultation. neither case was factually similar to the instant case.I09 The Fisheries Service
first relied on Sierra Club v. Babbit.' '1 Sierra Club held that the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") did not
have to engage in the Section 7 consultation process, because it did not have the ability to influence the
construction of a roadway to the benefit of the spotted owl.' The BLM could only object to the program in
three limited situations, not related to the protection of species.' 12 The second case relied on by the Fisheries
Service and the district court was Environmental Protection Information Center v. Simpson Timber Co." 3
Simpson Timber asked whether the Fish and Wildlife Service retained sufficient discretion over "incidental take
permits" to trigger a reinitiating of consultation." 4 In the Simpson case, the Ninth Circuit held that the Fish and
Wildlife Service did not retain enough discretion over the private company's actions to impose new
requirements to protect species that may be listed as endangered.' The Ninth Circuit distinguished these cases
by pointing out that. unlike in the instant case, the agency action involved was completed and there was "no
ongoing agency activity."" 6  The court found that continually issuing permits constitutes continued agency
activity that has a long-term effect. and may jeopardize the sea turtles survival."'
The court held that under the plain language of the Compliance Act, the Fisheries Service had sufficient
discretion to inure to the benefit of sea turtles. Additionally, the court held that because the Fisheries Service
Id. at 975.
Id.2
See id. at 975-77.
Id. at 975 (quoting Bennett v. Spear. 520 U.S. 154. 173 (1997)).
I. at 975-76 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 5503(d) (2000)). The two conditions the Compliance Act specified were "the markings of the
boat and reporting requirements." 16 U.S.C. § 5503(d).





0 Id. at 976. See also supra Part III.C.I.
Turtle Island Restoration Network. 340 F.3d at 976 (citing Sierra Club v. Babbit, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995)).
112 Id.
Id. at 976-77. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.2001).
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had discretion. they were required to engage in the consultation process to investigate the potential effects of the
permits on the protected species.I
V. COx111ENT
Generall.. the ESA requires that each federal agency consult with the secretary to "insure that any
action authorized. funded or carried out b\ such agency- will not jeopardize the survival of protected species.12 0
However. it is well established that if an auencv's action is ministerial in nature the agency is not required to
engage in the consultation process.' The Ninth Circuit's test for the agencyfs ability to "inure to the benefit of
protected species." is a test of discretion. and intuitively makes sense. If the agency has no power to alter or
condition its course of action to benefit protected species. then requiring it to determine if the action would
Jeopardize protected species w\ould be futile. In essence. the agency would consult with the expert agency,
prepare an assessment of the action. and proceed with the unavoidable course of action regardless of whether
the action jeopardized a protected species. U ndoubtedly. this would be a waste of time. money and effort for
both the action auency and the expert agency.
At issue in this case is whether the Fisheries Service retains sufficient discretion in issuing fishing
permits under the High Seas Fishing Act to subject the action to consultation under the ESA. The implications
of the answ\er significantly affect the long-line fishing industry. The Act grants the Secretary the authority to
issue permits and the abilit\ to condition the permits as necessary to carry out the obligations of the United
States under the Agreement. Specificall\. the statute says: "The Secretary shall establish such conditions
and restrictions on each permit issued under this section as are necessary and appropriate to carry out the
obligations of the I nited States under the Agreement. including but not limited to the following ..... 123 The
court relied partiall on a cannon of construction that the statute must be read in context and viewed in light of
the whole statutorx plan. and partiall\ on the Supreme Courtfs statement in Bennett v. Spears,'24 that every
w\ord and clause Within a statute ought to be given meaning if possible.12 5
Viewing the High Seas Fishing Act in its entirety requires us to look back to the Agreement that the Act
was designed to implement. The Act is intended to codify the Agreement. as is indicated by the purpose
statement. Ihe Agreement \\as neuotiated and entered into in response to the re-flagging of fishing vessels
in order to avoid compliance with international conservation measures. The Agreement expressly recognizes
that signator\ state's are responsible for taking -such measures for their respective nationals as may be
necessary for the conservation of the livine resources of the high seas[.]" 2 7 As the implementing measure of
the Agreement. the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act also requires fishing vessels permitted by the United
States to comply w ith international conservation measures. In fact. the Act defines international conservation
measures as: 1111easures to conser'e or manage one or more species of living marine resources that are
16 '.S.C. § 1536 (2000). Sce' lo a' r Part Il.C. I.
Sierra Club \. Babbitt. 65 F.3d 1502. 1509 (9th Cir. 1995).
16 U.S.C. § 5503(d) (2000).
h/ (emphasis added).
Bennett \. Spear. 520 U.S. 154. 173 (1997).
Turtle Island Restoration.Yevork. 340 F.3d at 975.
16 U.S.C. § 5501 (the purpose of the High Seas Fishing Act is to *implement the Agreement to Promote Compliance with
International Consernation and Manauenent Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. adopted by the Conference of the Food
and Auriculture Ormanization of the United Nations on November 24. 1993 . .
Aureeient. suPra note 39. at Preamble.
65
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adopted and applied in accordance with the relevant rules of international law. as reflected in the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and that are recognized by the United States . . . ." 12x
Specifically, the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act states that the permits may be conditioned and
restricted "as [is] necessary and appropriate to carry out the obligations of the United States under the
Agreement . . ." Congress explicitly authorized the Secretary to place conditions on the fishing permits to
fulfill the responsibilities of the United States under the Agreement. 3 o Substantively. the Agreement requires
party nations to both develop a permitting system and comply with international conservation and protection
measures for marine resources.' 3'
The Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles ("Convention") is an
example of an international conservation measure which the United States is a signatory member. In fact the
United States was a primary proponent of the Convention. The purpose of the Convention was to develop
standards for the protection and conservation of sea turtles. 1 As a signatorv member. the United States must
regulate the activities of commercial fishing in such a way that protects and preserves endangered sea turtles.'."
The consultation process of Section 7 of the ESA is meant to identify actions that may jeopardize the survival of
protected species and to identify alternatives to those actions: an objective that is in accordance with the
purpose and obligations of the United States under the Convention.
Viewing the Act, as a whole. in light of the intent to codify the Agreement. the court correctly
determined that it was not Congress's intent to create an exhaustive list of conditions. Not only does the
language "including but not limited to the following" indicate this. but the statute states that conditions may
be placed that fulfill the obligations of the United States under the Agreement. One such obligation of the
United States under the Agreement is to comply with international conservation measures such as the Inter-
American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles. It is clear that the Secretary could
impose conditions sufficient to satisfy the Ninth's Circuit test of discretionary agency action under Section 7 of
the ESA ("inure to the benefit of the protected species").
With Congress's intent determined. the court's interpretation of the statute stops: the court must yield to
the clear intent of Congress.' 36 The Agency's interpretation is rightly not given deference. because the Fisheries
Service's interpretation of its ability to condition permits to inure to the benefit of protected species is contrary
to the unambiguous lan uage of the statute. Chevron plainly establishes that when Congress's intent is clear. it
is the end of the matter.
The instant court was careful to establish that it was not holdinu that the Fisheries Service must
condition the permits. Instead the court held that Fisheries Service must engage in the consultation process
required by the ESA to determine if the issuance of permits may jeopardize the survival of the protected turtles.
The determination that Fisheries Service is obliged to conduct the consultation process could destroy the
longline fishing industry based in California. Until the process of consultation is completed. the Secretary may
not engage in activity that may jeopardize the turtles. including issuing fishing permits. The economic impact
of this case on the longline fishing industry surely will be harsh. The industry has already been banned in
Hawaii. If the Fisheries Service determines. as Hawaii has. that longline lishing jeopardizes the critical habitat
121 16 USC § 5502(5).
129 Id. § 5503 (emphasis added).
130 See supra Pan Ill.A.1.
131Id.
32 See generall Convention. supra note 35 (signed b\ the United States: ratifed b\ the Senate on September 21. 2000).
33 See discussion supra Part 1II.A.2.
1 Id.
s See 16 U.S.C. § 5503(d) (2000).
136 Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council. Inc.. 467 U.S. 837. 842-43 (1984).
Id. at 842.
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or survival of any of the six species of sea the industry will likely not be able to continue the process of longline
fishing in the area, unless reasonable alternatives can be found. As indicated by the Supreme Court decision in
TVA v. Hill, however, Congress intended to afford the highest priority to endangered species with the passage of
the ESA, regardless of the cost.' 38
VI. CONCLUSION
The concerns surrounding longline fishing and the industry's effect on sea turtles have prompted action
to protect the turtles. This case has been seen as a small victory for sea turtles. On the heels of this decision. the
National Marine Fisheries Service issued a new rule banning longline fishing for swordfish off the shores the
West Coast.139 This ban is similar to the one in Hawaii that caused numerous longline fishermen to move their
operation from Hawaii to California.140 With the ban in place. the court's requirement that the Fisheries Service
engage in the consultation process is moot, but the message is still clear: the protection of endangered species is
a national priority, even at significant costs to industry.
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